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ABSTRACT:
We present a model for the supply-demand law with quality and limited
information capability. We postulate that imperfect information permeates
in almost all economic transactions to varying degrees. Through a simple
model we outline a research agenda that re-examines many standard issues
in economics. Our analysis shows that whereas imperfect information can be
improved, it leads to new uncertainties so that the perfect information limit
can never be reached. As a corollary neoclassical perfect equilibrium can never
be attained.
1 Introduction
The standard supply and demand law in economics relates price and quantity;
equilibrium is achieved when the consumers’ downward demand curve and
the firm’s upward supply curve intersect. When Alfred Marshall more than a
century ago first systematically studied the law and its applications, he used
it merely as a convenient technical device[1]. Neoclassical economics since
has made it the most important theoretical pillar. The core content of the
supply-demand law has remained the same over the past century, in which
the world economy has undergone dramatic transitions. However, products
in the modern economy are much more complex a century later, and hence
the capability to ascertain their quality from the consumers’ side plays a
paramount importance in purchase decisions.
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In the days of Mill and Ricardo there were already vocal critiques by
well known thinkers like Charles Babbage[2] and Cliffe Leslie[3], questioning
the assumption of classical economics of perfect information capability. Fast
forward to 1970, Akerlof’s work [4] on the ‘Lemons Problem’ clearly pointed
out that strong information asymmetry about the product’s quality can lead
to ‘market failures’. Mutually beneficial deals between sellers and buyers
may not happen, if the buyers cannot reliably determine the quality of the
objects under transaction. Despite much current research on many other
interesting areas of Information Asymmetry[5][6], the fundamental insight of
Akerlof is not yet adequately incorporated into mainstream economics. In
standard textbooks one encounters ‘price’ and ‘quantity’, rarely ‘quality’ is
adequately modeled.
In this work we shall consider an alternative version of the supply-demand
law, with quality and imperfect information as the key ingredients. We con-
sider a continuously varying degree of imperfect information, with the Akerlof
‘Lemons Problem’ as a special, extreme case. We posit that in all economic
transactions, some degree of information imperfection always exists. In the
modern economy, especially in aﬄuent societies, the conduct of daily life ne-
cessitates a myriad of products and services, which become ever more com-
plex in their visible and invisible features. On the other hand a consumer as
a ‘generalist’[18] in consumption cannot possibly spend sufficient time and
resources to determine what she is buying each time. Our position is an-
ticipated by Kenneth Arrow[7]: “Market failure is not absolute; it is better
to consider a broader category, that of transaction costs, which in general
impede and in particular cases block the formation of markets”.
2 Quality and Information
2.1 demand side
Let us denote by Q the quality of a product (to be distinguished from the
usual notation quantity—hereafter denoted by q); by 1/² information capa-
bility for a consumer to see through the quality. ² =∞ implies she is totally
ignorant of the product’s quality; ² = 0, she has perfect clairvoyance, i.e. no
errors made. The information capability depends on her ability and effort
of detecting the quality as well as on the producer’s marketing strategies of
either facilitating or hindering such detection. Thus ², a relational parame-
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ter, depends on both sides rather than consumers’ innate capability alone. A
consumer may be good at ascertaining quality for one type of product while
being ignorant for many other types. ² can also serve as a measure of the
severity of information asymmetry.
Note that quality Q cannot be a priori measured in monetary terms: it
must be priced through market transactions. Price p and quality Q should
be treated as independent variables. From daily economic life we can ob-
serve that quality and price are always more or less correlated, sometimes
to an astonishing degree. This intuition may lead us to believe that quality
and price are so well correlated that there is no need to treat quality as an
independent variable. On the other hand, we also observe that small but ap-
preciable quality fluctuations do exist for a given price; experts and careless
consumers may end up buying products with substantial deviations in the
quality-to-price ratio. By treating quality and price independently we shall
nevertheless recover their correlation through market transactions; but such
a correlation depends on the level of information capability of the consuming
public.
The central function for our present work q(Q, p, ²) measures the aggre-
gate quantity consumers will buy a given product. For simplicity we assume
they are all of the same information capability level—more interesting inho-
mogeneous case will be postponed till a later section. The aggregate demand
is from N potential consumers
q(Q, p, ²) =
N∑
i=1
qi(Q, p, ²). (1)
We assume that any product is to some extent substitutable, therefore a
potential buyer can decide either to buy, how much, or walk away. For
simplicity we consider the product in discrete units. A qi less than unity, say
0.30, implies the consumer has the probability of 30% to buy; a qi greater
than unity can be directly interpreted as the individual’s demand function.
Throughout this paper we shall use the aggregate q rather than the individual
qi, unless otherwise specified. All the three variables (q,Q, p) are expressed
in unspecified units such that only their relative values are of interest. Thus
the quantity q is linearly proportional to the ‘likelihood’ for a consumer to
buy a given product, apart from a constant of the order of O(N).
To highlight the new role of quality Q and to keep the algebra to a
minimum, we first consider price p being fixed, and postpone the discussion
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Figure 1: The demand function q(Q, ²) for three different values of ².
of the full set of parameters and their relations in the subsequent sections.
Hence for our reduced problem we have q(Q, ²). Let us start by considering
the hypothetical case of perfect clairvoyance q(Q, ² = 0), in Fig.1. It is a
sharply downward linear function as quality Q decreases. Transactions have
the highest likelihood when Q = Qmax, (for convenience we take this Qmax
value to be unity). This likelihood drops linearly to null at Qmin = AQ0,
and remains null for Q < Qmin. The difference Qmax − Qmin measures the
tolerance for the consumer. Even armed with perfect clairvoyance, her buying
likelihood is tolerant within a finite range. This range can depend on possible
competitions among the producers—a question we shall raise later.
Let us also plot q(Q, ²) for finite ² in Fig.1, i.e. limited capability to detect
the quality of the product. Our general assumption in this work is that with
reduced transparency, the consumer may misperceive the true quality, to the
extent parameterized by ². Thus the demand curve is somewhat flatter than
the perfect clairvoyant case. In other words, the demand response to the
quality incentive is less sensitive.
The overall transaction likelihood should also drop as quality visibility
is reduced, in line with Akerlof’s ‘market failure’ observation. The highest
likelihood (at Q = Qmax) is reduced by a factor A = 1/(1 + ²). This stems
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from the consideration that being aware of their handicap of information
asymmetry, consumers reduce, somewhat indiscriminately of quality, their
overall confidence in what they would purchase. The reduction is in relation
to the severity of the information asymmetry. Akerlof ‘Lemons Problem’ is
recovered when ² =∞, i.e. the worst degree of information asymmetry, hence
the factor A is null and no transaction. In keeping with our main postulate,
we insist that all transactions are subject to some degree of information
asymmetry, only the degree varies.
The above considerations can be easily coded into a simple formula:
q(Q, ²) = A(Q− AQ0)/(1− AQ0), (2)
where A is the above mentioned confidence factor. Note that q(Qmax, ²) =
A, for any ². In proposing the above formula, we try to keep the functions
simple and whenever possible, linear functions are preferred. Q0 = 7/8. The
choice of parameters seems to be somewhat contrived; this is because the
formula is a special example of the full expression q(Q, p, ²), to be discussed
later.
2.2 supply side
We assume that the firm knows only its profit margins per unit product if sold
at a given price. At the fixed constant price as we have assumed before, his
per-unit-profit (revenue less cost) is taken as a linearly decreasing function
of Q,
g(Q) = 1−Q. (3)
Q has the general range [0,1] but we shall further limit its range so that the
profit g(Q) is non-negative. We assume that the firm knows perfectly the
quality of its product, thus no ²-dependence for g(Q). We plot g(Q) in Fig.2.
Note that the above g(Q) does not depend on quantity to be produced. It’s
straightforward to relax this assumption to consider quantity-dependence: a
custom-made item has a different per-unit profit than mass-produced items.
We assume that the firm’s objective is to maximize its total profit, rather
than merely the per-unit profit. If the firm can decide its product’s price and
quality, then the quantity must be decided by the market.
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Figure 2: The per-unit profit for the firm.
2.3 market
We are ready to take the demand and supply sides to meet in the market.
The firm’s total profit from a given type of product is defined as:
G(Q, ²) = q(Q, ²)g(Q). (4)
Whereas the total profit, or total gain to the firm is G, we can denote
by B = B(q, ²) the total benefit that accrues to consumers. In the simplest
form B is proportional to the quality of the product bought, conditional on
the buying probability. In general there can be a constant factor β in the
definition, which we choose to be 1/2 for convenience.
B(Q, ²) = βQq(Q, ²). (5)
Why is B not just Q? This is because the good quality of a product
is not enough for consumers: if they have a lousy ² hence negligible quan-
tity q actually bought. Therefore both conditions must simultaneously be
satisfied: the product being bought (large q) and with good quality (large
Q), in order to be enjoyed. Other types of B can be proposed, however our
main conclusions will not be affected. Whereas G depends on Q in a non
trivial way, B is a monotonically increasing function of Q. In fact we have
B ∼ Q2. For our understanding of how this market works let us point out
that the total economic pie is the sum G+B, though the firm only consider
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Figure 3: The firm’s total profit G as a function of Q for three values of ².
G-maximization as its motivation. In the current model, the firm has the
production initiatives.
We plot the total gainG(Q, ²) versusQ for various values of ² in Fig.3. It is
a quadratic function in Q with downwards parabolic shapes. A rational firm
would attempt to maximize its total gain G(Q, ²). If consumers have some
capability of seeing the underlying quality, the firm will not be too ‘greedy’
to sell a product with too low a quality, lest too few products be sold. On
the other hand, it would not ‘charitably’ sell a product with too high quality
since the (slightly) increased output cannot not offset the diminished per-unit
profit margins. Therefore facing a given ², which characterizes the current
information relation, the firm would choose a suitable Q to maximize G(Q, ²).
Since G(Q, ²) is a quadratic function in Q, there is a unique maximizing
solution, denoted by Q∗(²) and it turns out to be (1+AQ0)/2, as a function
of ². Let us assume that the firm alone decides at which Q to make the
product and the rational firm desires to produce exactly at the maximizing
point Q∗(²), at whatever ² as an external condition.
We find q∗(²) ≡ q(Q∗(²), ²) = A/2 and together with Q∗(²)(= 1+AQ0)/2)
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Figure 4: Both quantity and quality decrease as information capability dete-
riorates (² increases).
both are monotonically decreasing functions with ², as plotted in Fig.4. The
corresponding total gain G∗(²) ≡ G(Q∗(²), ²) turns out to be A(1−AQ0)/4,
as plotted in Fig.5. As information capability increases (i.e. ² diminishes),
G∗(²) initially increases. There is an inflection point at ²∗ = 2Q0 − 1
(G∗(²∗) = 1/(16Q0)). Reducing further ² beyond this point makes G∗(²)
decrease rapidly. This is a remarkable effect that a very high level of infor-
mation capability leads to the firm’s reduced profit; whereas when very low
it is also detrimental to the firm.
2.4 information capability
So far we have treated ², the central parameter of our model, as if it were
a god-given, external parameter. In the real world, both the producer and
the consumer have some influence in its value. Even though by definition
1/² represents information capability for consumers to discern a product’s
quality, a producer certainly has options to either facilitate or hinder the task.
Both demand and supply sides can make ² change. The firm can market its
products more or less transparently; consumers with different experience and
search effort can also impact its value. The simplest assumption posits that
the general ² is the product of two factors. Neither Producers nor consumers
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Figure 5: Given ², the optimized G∗(²) can be divided into three regions:
I–defensive; II–collaborative; III–innovative. An overall increase in informa-
tion capability, as described in (7) will move product A to A’, B to B’.
have monopolistic control of it, but rather both exert a mutual control.
² = ²firm · ²consumer. (6)
Given that both sides can influence ², let us examine who would like to move
it in which direction, if they can. Let us consider what the producer and
consumers would do to influence ². In region II of Fig.5. reducing ² is to the
interests of both the producer and consumers. Each side would use whatever
leeway available to them to reduce ²firm or ²consumer. Look at region I of Fig.6.
G∗(²) decreases with ² while B∗ = B(Q∗(²), ²) increases at the same time.
We conclude that while in region II the interests of both sides overlap; in
region I they conflict.
Let us examine the implications of the above conclusion. When a new
product comes to market, in the beginning phase we should expect the cor-
responding information capability to be relatively low. Thus in region II the
producer in his own interest would make effort to reduce the difficulty of de-
tecting quality, i.e. to educate and help consumers. In region I, on the other
hand, it is rational for the firm to exercise its available marketing tactics to
make information about the product’s quality more opaque, to induce errors
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by consumers. In this region the two sides’ interests diverge. The firm’s
behavior in region I can be termed defensive.
The above observation has serious consequences on the current thinking
of marketing practices, as it is in serious conflict with the position held by
many mainstream economists. Among the most important marketing tools
is advertising. In the economic literature there are two major categories of
advertisements recognized: informative and persuasive[8]. Deceitful tactics
like disinformation, various marketing gambits like loss leaders, and other
questionable marketing tactics are rarely accounted for in the academic lit-
erature. This is because in neoclassical economics the role of information is
downplayed. For example in the famous paper ‘De gustibus non est disputan-
dum’[9] by Stigler and Becker, advertising is seen as communicating infor-
mation about a product from the firm to consumers, and both sides seem to
have their interests always aligned and never was there a question about the
consumer information capability. The possibility of distorting information is
not accounted for. Our above results show, however, that whereas in some
regions both sides’ interests do converge, in other regions their interests may
be opposed to each other. Thus one side may spend effort and/or money
to penetrate the foggy information veil; the other side may spend to hin-
der the former’s effort. Such mutually destructive forces may have profound
implications in understanding the modern economy.
The convergence or divergence of these interests is not a black-and-white
story, the degree of severity is the key. In Fig.6 we depict together G∗(²)
and B∗(²). A more detailed picture can be obtained by considering the
derivatives, which show the intensity with which the profit G∗ and benefit
B∗ change while reducing ²—and hence the incentives for these changes.
−∂G∗/∂² = A2(1− 2AQ0)/4 and −∂B∗/∂² = βA2(1 + 2AQ0)/4. The minus
sign is because we are interested in the reduction of ². Note that −∂B/∂² is
larger and grows faster than −∂G/∂², implying that the ‘marginal gain’ for
consumers with a given amount of ² reduction is larger than that for the firm.
Nevertheless the producer is cooperative in region II; the two sides would
work towards the same goal, even though improved information capability
accrues more benefit to consumers and the firm faces diminishing returns. In
region I the two sides strive to annihilate each other’s efforts. This represents
a negative-sum-game embedded in a larger positive-sum-game.
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Figure 6: The consumer benefit B(²) and the firm’s total profit G(²) can be
said collaborative in region II whereas conflictory in region I.
2.5 magic pie
It is instructive to visualize the above results using pie-charts. They give us
an instructive picture of what is at stake. We define the total economic pie
Σ = G + B and let us see who gets what share (G versus B), for various
values of ².
In Fig.7. we show three pie-charts, one for region I, then one at ²∗, and
one for region II. The total economic pie size Σ is represented by the area
of the entire pie. At some point in region II when the pie is small since ² is
large, the firm would try to increase his pie-slice which is his real motivation.
In so doing he also promotes the global welfare, i.e. the total economic pie.
As a matter of fact from Fig.6. we learn that his efforts of promoting his own
welfare would benefit more the other side, consumers. He is less enthusiastic
in further reducing ² when approaching nearer the inflection point ²∗. At this
point he has the highest total profit and if possible he would like to remain
there forever. However, the total welfare is only maximized at the ideal limit
² = 0. Further information improvement is against his interest as in this
region his pie-slice becomes smaller, even though the total pie size is larger.
He would not hesitate to use whatever defensive options are available to him
to make information opaque. The most important lesson to retain is that
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Figure 7: B∗(²) (white) and G∗(²) (shade) as shares of a pie-chart, for three
different values of ². The total area represents the total economic pie, which
depends on how the pie is divided. With low information capability, the firm’s
relative share is large but the total pie is small; with very high information
capability the total pie is much larger but the firm’s share can be also small.
the optimum sits somewhere in the middle. At a fixed ² value and for non-
optimized G(Q, ²), we have also a larger pie but a small G-share for Q >
Q∗(²); a smaller pie but a large G-share for Q < Q∗(²)
the total welfare of the both sides cannot be maximized: it depends on the
information capability and the degree of information asymmetry, despite of
the fact that the both sides are as rational and selfish as they can. To improve
the total welfare we need better market institutions as well as advances in
Information Technologies.
On Fig.5. there is also region III, representing the production and mar-
keting possibilities that are not yet viable due to the scarce understanding
by the consuming public. These possibilities represent mostly innovations
and may contribute towards a firm’s future profit. However, due to very
limited information capability they are not yet marketable. The truncation
line between regions II and III depends on many details; but in principle a
producer knows where he should start the pursuit of novelty and innovation.
Our above approach may seem to lead to an optimal state akin to neo-
classical General Equilibrium. We shall see that since our system is not a
closed one, there are always potentially viable innovations which are not yet
exploited. Information capability should not be treated as a fixed parameter,
many factors can make it vary hence any seemingly optimal state is precari-
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ous. We shall discuss two main such factors: one is the evolution of general
information technology, the other human cognition.
2.6 evolution
First we consider the impact of the information technology evolution may
have on the above supply and demand relationship. When a new technology
is developed which can significantly increase consumers’ information capa-
bility, we may expect that there is a global (downward) shift on all ²i, where
i = 1, 2, ... is a label for the ith product. For this purpose it is convenient to
consider that the general shift for all products, occurs in the manner
²′i = ²gen · ²i, (7)
where ²gen < 1 denotes the general downwards shift. If this happens, a
product A in region I would now be shifted to A′ in Fig.5. Products in this
region are normally mature, relatively simple, and generic. The producer
who spent resources defending (distorting information) it before now would
face a still tougher battle. The general tendency is against his defensive
attempts. Facing diminishing profit margins for the products in region I, the
producer may recoup with the products in region II, where he would have an
easier job promoting, educating consumers now. This is shown by the shift
from B to B′. There is a small fraction of products that would be pushed
over the other side of the hill, i.e. from region II to region I. The producer
who facilitated product-quality-transparency now would switch tactics and
engage in camouflage marketing gambits for these cross-over products.
Most interesting are the potential products in region III. The products
previously not viable now may turn out to be profitable opportunities for
the firm, with the general information capability enhancing trend. This re-
gion represents inexhaustible future innovations and novelties, and keeps our
economy open-ended. This is in sharp contrast with the mechanical paradigm
adopted by neoclassical economics, which typically defines a problem with
well defined boundaries: factors are either immutably included or excluded.
There is no place for unknown or barely known factors. With the open-ended
region III of unlimited future possibilities and their concomitant uncertain-
ties, our system can never reach static General Equilibrium. What about
infinite information capability that the General Equilibrium approach re-
quires? We see that as ² → 0 there is no well defined static state: mature
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products for which ² is much reduced and the squeezed profits make the
producer abandon it; the innovative varieties previously not viable come to
the fore with concomitant larger ². Therefore we always have information
huddles to overcome; we must deal with a dynamic process, such an economy
will never end up in an equilibrium.
The next factor we consider is human cognition. Newer products always
put strain on consumers’ information capability. Consumers gradually get
acquainted with the product through accumulated experience via repeated
use, learning, etc. Thus during the life-time of a product-line, i.e. from its
inception to its final demise, we expect the parameter ² evolves gradually from
large to small. The rate can vary from product to product, and consumer to
consumer, but ² cannot stay constant in general. This cognitive evolution can
be either assisted or hindered by the firm, giving the latter an additional lever
in its rational pursuit of profit. In fact many firms use this observation to
plot their long term profit strategy: instead of maximizing the profit at every
instant during the product-line’s lifetime, they find it more advantageous to
market it in the initial phase with little or even negative profit. By so doing
they accelerate the ² reduction it will allow the firm to cash in later, more
than enough to offset the initial losses. This amounts to maximizing the
total profit over the whole lifetime of the product-line. It is well known to
the business community that the long term maximization goal is often at
odds with the short term goal. We may propose the following function:
Glifetime =
∫ T
0
dtG[Q(t), p(t), ²(t)], (8)
where G is a function over Q, p, and ² (which are yet to be specified func-
tions of time t). For simplicity questions like interest rates, depreciation, etc
are temporarily suppressed. The profit objective for the firm is to choose
appropriate functions Q(t) and p(t), given the cognitive evolution course of
²(t), to maximize Glifetime. The previous condition of g being non-negative
should be relaxed, as temporary loss can be admitted. Note that this is not
maximization in the usual sense, as now the choices are in the strategy space:
functions, not parameters, are scanned over. The firm must choose appropri-
ate functions Q(t) and p(t) to achieve the maximal long term result, a task
far from being obvious even for a rational and competitive firm. Satisficing
a´ la Herbert Simon [10] instead of maximizing is probably the way out.
The products and services in the modern economy are often complex com-
positions of many factors, as Lancaster has advocated in a similar context[11].
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A modern product generally contains many such factors which separately de-
mand varying degrees of information capability. In such situation we expect
that the producer’s marketing tactics to be a mixed bag: genuinely educating
consumers about some novel factors of the product, while at the same time
distorting information about other factors, all about a single product.
To conclude this section let us emphasize again the need of treating qual-
ity as an independent variable. We may have general impression that our
information is roughly adequate for the current economy, we are not cheated
outright on most economic transactions, trifling as well as vital. After all,
even if we were empowered with perfect information capability, as a conse-
quence improvement to our welfare may not amount to much. This impres-
sion may justify regarding neoclassical General Equilibrium as a more or less
adequate approximation to reality. The fallacy in this reasoning lies in the
fact that current economic offerings are the results of our limited informa-
tion capability; the demand and supply sides have co-evolved to a state in
which we find our current economy. This implies that we won’t find our in-
formation capability outrageously inadequate of the task: such offerings are
simply not proposed. Improved information may seem to reach only finite
extra gains, but maximization is illusory. New frontiers are constantly being
opened; what seems to be small now will turn out to dominate in the future.
Indeed, information and cognitive capabilities are able to drive the economy
evolving with no fixed objectives in sight.
3 Supply side uncertainties
3.1 price vs quantity
As we mentioned in the above section, so far we have limited ourselves to
the simplest case where price is held constant. Thus the new variable Q and
its reliance on limited information capability can be studied with a minimal
algebra. In this section we shall instead fix quality Q and let price p vary.
The full complexity of the most interesting case with both Q and p present,
and especially the relationship between the two is postponed until the next
section. The price dependence can be easily extended as follows,
q(Q, p, ²) = 2(1− p)A(Q−Q0)/(1−Q0), and g(Q, p) = (1 + δ)p−Q. (9)
The previously discussed q(Q, ²) and G(Q) obtain for p = 1/2 and δ = 1.
δ measures the per-unit profit when the product is sold at pmax = 1 and
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Qmax = 1. This profit margin can be set to zero in the extreme case. We
shall discuss its role when competition is present in a later section. The
ranges for both Q and p are calibrated to be within [0,1], and they are further
constrained by the requirement that both q(Q, p, ²) and g(Q, p) being non-
negative.
Now we want to fix Q to a constant which is not explicitly expressed. Up
to a constant the above q becomes simply q(p, ²) = A(1− p). Even without
the explicit dependence on Q, q still depends on information capability. This
is because that consumers with finite information capability are not sure of
the product’s quality, albeit it is a fixed constant. The firm’s aim is still to
maximize the total gain G(p, ²) = q(p, ²)g(p), which can be done in steps
parallel to those of the last section which we shall not spell out explicitly
here.
3.2 supply curve
To make the comparison between our new approach to the standard supply-
demand law in the economics literature, we need to consider the relation
between price and quantity, the central parameters in the demand and supply
curves. The decreasing function q(p) of p can be easily identified with the
demand curve in economics. But where is the supply curve? Let us recall
that ever since Marshall, there have been controversies regarding the supply
curve. A sample of various misgivings among economists can be found in
ref[12].
Let us examine the supply curve question in detail within our new for-
malism. We start with the basic question: can a firm have demand curve
knowledge, and to what precision? If a firm knew exactly its customers re-
sponse function q, then since by definition it knows its own per-unit-product
profit, there would be no need at all for the supply curve: its maximizing
imperatives supersede any other theoretical constructs. Market equilibrium
would be established as well: the firm must weigh tradeoffs between a higher
per-unit profit (price) and a higher sale volume (lower price). Thus the sup-
ply curve is superfluous. It seems that we may do away with the supply
curve.
But we shall see below that a supply curve can indeed play an important
role and it emerges naturally for a completely different reason than that
assumed in neoclassical economics. Suppose that the firm does not know
exactly what its customers’ responses would be for a new product. From its
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Figure 8: A firm has some assumptions about the demand curve, plotted are
three examples. The family of the would-be optimal responses represents a
supply curve.
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marketing research and previous experience it has some expectations of the
function q(Q, p, ²), or the restrictive form q(p, ²). Suppose further that this
uncertainty is represented by a family of demand curves, as the few examples
depicted in Fig.8. There can be a large number of demand curves in a limited
region, each curve does not need to carry the same weight, as the firm may
consider some curves more likely than others. But from past experiences the
firm decides to be prudent, to hedge with enough contingencies just in case
its own production commitment, which might arise from consensus among
its executives, goes wrong. Since we assume that the firm knows its own per-
unit-profit function, at least better than the demand curves of other people,
it must face the maximization task with the above uncertainty about its
customers’ reactions, aka the demand curves. For each of the hypothetical
demand curves, there corresponds an optimal price. If the family of the
demand curves is taken to be continuous, then these hypothetical prices
would form a continuous curve—the supply curve! Of course a continuum of
demand curves is a fiction, more likely there is a finite number of hypothetical
demand curves, which would yield a supply curve with a dotted line, as
depicted in Fig.8.
3.3 firm’s uncertainties
Suppose that after the production commitment, the market reveals that one
of the hypothetical demand curves turns out to be realized; suppose further
that the firm’s consensus for the expected demand curve was somewhat dif-
ferent, then as depicted in Fig.9. The firm must take steps to correct the
discrepancy. In the example of Fig.9 the firm was over-optimistic in expect-
ing the demand curve and already produced (or committed to produce) the
quantity qf , hoping to fetch a price pf . It now has some options in finding
the best solution out of the less-than-optimal situation (over-production).
Suppose the optimum turns out to be (p∗, q∗), and qf > q∗. The firm may
decide to sell all the product quantity qf in any case to the market, but so
doing it cannot expect to be able to price the product at the optimal value
p∗; in fact when the product is sold till clearance, it fetches a price p1 < p∗,
so that the pair (p1, qf ) lies on the real demand curve in Fig.9. However the
pair (p∗, q∗) dominates over the pair (p1, qf ) on the real demand curve by def-
inition of the optimum. This implies that destroying the excess production,
assuming such disposal is costless, is a more profitable option than insisting
to sell all that is (over-) produced. An alternative option is to insist on selling
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Figure 9: The consensus-anticipated and the real demand curves. Overpro-
duction calls for corrective measures.
at the price pf of the consensus-anticipated demand. This would not help
to clear the production, but land us on the pair (pf , q1), with pf > p
∗ and
q1 < q
∗. This is a worse option since the firm needs to dispose of a larger
amount of unsold inventory, and the resulting pair (pf , q1) is worse than the
optimal pair. In sum, for this simple example of discrepancy between the
anticipated and real demand curves, the best way out for the firm is to dis-
pose some of the excessive inventory, and then to reap profits at the optimal
quantity and price determined jointly by the real demand curve and its own
profit function. There are a plethora of other possible scenarios that one
can contemplate, depending on the type of mis-expectations and whether
the disposal is costly or not. Equally well one can envisage a scenario when
the firm under-estimated the real demand curve. In this case there would be
missed opportunities.
Let us call the above adjustments in quantity and price ∆q = q − q∗ and
19
∆p = p − p∗. To correct the consequences from overproduction, the above
firm faces three options: 1) ∆q = 0 but ∆p < 0; 2) ∆q < 0 and ∆p < 0;
3) ∆q < 0, ∆p = 0. We see that the most profitable option for the firm
is 2), simultaneously correcting both the quantity and price. Some people
might see an amusing similarity with Heisenberg ‘uncertainty principle’ in
Quantum Mechanics, where uncertainties over a pair of variables cannot be
simultaneously eliminated. But there is no fundamental reason beyond this
coincidence.
Besides the unavoidable uncertainty for the firm to estimate the real de-
mand curve, thus necessitating a suite of contingencies that we can call the
supply curve. We note that consumers’ tastes and price-sensitivity are al-
ways changing as the market evolves; thus the rational firm is always well
advised to prepare enough contingencies to cope with the unexpected. The
firm must spend both in effort and in financial resources to do substantial
marketing research, striving to know better approximations to the real de-
mand curve. However no matter how much it spends, the exact demand
curve, which is shifting constantly in any case, cannot be known and clear-
ance does not happen in general. Any marketing research should involve
actual tests by selling some amount of the product; this helps to reduce un-
certainty. We should expect that there are always either wasted products or
missed opportunities—the necessary extra costs due to uncertainties on the
firm’s side.
From the above discussion we see that the supply curve arises naturally if
the firm’s knowledge about the demand curve cannot be known exactly. The
rational firm must take its own lack of perfect knowledge into account by
preparing a contingency plan—hence our supply curve. Clearance is in gen-
eral not guaranteed and additional corrective measures are necessary. Some
options are less costly than others but extra costs are inevitable, either in
the form of physical costs or lost opportunities, or both. This approach
introduces naturally time as a new dimension: as the firm strives to antici-
pate the demand curve, which itself can evolve, a dynamic sequence should
follow. One may note the similarity with Lucas’ Critique and rational ex-
pectation theory, where the dynamic sequence plays an important role in
macro-economics[13].
In neoclassical economics clearance is assumed. There appears to be two
criteria for the market to clear: 1) the traditional demand and supply curves
intersect at the market quantity and price; 2) the firm’s supply motivation
in the presence of the demand curve and its own costs-profit considerations.
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Our above maximizing total gain by the firm is essentially the second type
in disguise. This poses a potential logic problem for microeconomics: two
criteria may not always be consistent. Of course such inconsistency can be
easily avoided by insisting on clearance, and then the two criteria amount
to the same thing. Our drastic proposition is to discard the primary supply
curve entirely, without affecting the supply-meets-demand law. The trouble
we get from this logic is no more guarantee of clearance and subsequent
corrective measures are necessary. Isn’t it a feature of reality? The secondary,
or derived supply curve plays a new and important role as a device to cope
with uncertainties about the other side, consumers’ demand curve.
By dropping one of the two blades of Marshall’s scissors, we lose the
mechanical certainty that supply meets demand on fixed tracks. We must
take into account non-clearance and non-zero profit margins, questions such
as these become the subjects of study, rather than being taken for granted
assumptions. Our new approach requires the firm to evaluate a finite numbers
of options, none of them optimal, to find the better one. Since information
is always imperfect and innovations and uncertainties in unlimited supply,
there is no room for mechanical optimization.
Given that firms face also uncertainty about consumers demand, the total
profit maximization so far described can be at best approximative. As a
matter of fact, the G-function is rather flat near its peak value, the firm will
probably choose some value not too far from the inflection point, in reality.
4 Quality Pricing
4.1 the full equation
We finally stand to examine the full fledged relation among the three funda-
mental variables Q, p, and q. The fact we represent q as a function of other
two is just for convenience, we could as well choose any one as a function of
other two variables. We shall see that our multiple variables approach brings
interesting new features into the supply-demand law; notably, it allows for
the first time to price quality. Such pricing is not unique as assumed in neo-
classical theory; rather, it depends on information capability, among other
factors.
In the economics literature, one rarely examines quality pricing mecha-
nism. Even in the work on Information Asymmetry the underlying quality is
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represented by its ‘true price’. This still begs the question: who has priced
correctly the used cars in the first place? As if some super-human-being with
infinite information capability has determined the true price, with which all
other prices constrained on imperfect information should be compared. Take
for example Grossman and Stiglitz in ref.[14], for the case of pricing finan-
cial assets. To correctly price a stock, these authors recognize that investors
may not have sufficient information for the task, so a stock’s price could be
away from its fundamental value. Less informed investors may choose to buy
the requisite information. In our view this just shifts the pricing problem
from one place (stock) to the other (information). How can one be sure
the purchased information is reliable, and to what extent? Without com-
pletely weaning from neoclassical doctrines one is easily trapped in a circular
argument.
We consider the fully generalized quantity function
q(Q, p, ²) =
1
²
(1− p)(Q−Qmin(p)), (10)
where
Qmin(p) = A[(1−Q0)p+Q0]. (11)
The factor 1 − p is easily interpreted as in the last section and Q0 = 3/4.
The last factor needs some explanation:the motivation is that for a higher
price the nonzero range of q in Q should be narrower, as consumers are more
demanding for more expensive products than they are for cheaper ones. For
the firm’s profit we have g(Q, p) = p − Q, which is the same as in the last
section, except we consider the simplest case δ = 0. Similarly to the simpler
case Fig.3, it is instructive to plot the total profit function G(Q, p, ²) =
g(Q, p)q(Q, p, ²) for a few ²-values in Fig.10. Instead of plotting 3D figures
we choose to use gray-scale contours to indicate G-value. For our choice
of δ = 0, ² → 0 is a special limit: the overlap between the non-vanishing
regions of q and g vanishes also. q decreases with Q, when the other two
variables are held constant, and it vanishes at the borderline. As ² increases,
the borderline moves leftwards and its dependence on Q becomes flatter.
The above q(Q, p, ²) function can be reduced to the simpler q(Q, ²) or q(p, ²)
in the last two sections when either p or Q is held constant, apart from an
²-dependent factor. Note that the last factor of q(Q, p, ²) has both Q and p
dependence. Note that the features in the above construction of q are quite
general, other functions can be treated as long as they satisfy the following
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Figure 10: The total profit G(Q, p, ²) as a function of both Q and p, for given
values of ². For high information capability (right), G is concentrated in a
small area, with the (implicit) tight correlation between Q and p. For low
information capability (left), G is very dispersed and the Qp correlation is
very loose. For any given ², the peak value of G gives off the coordinates
(Q∗(²),p∗(²)), which is the solution (13).
criteria: q is an increasing function in Q, decreasing in p and the borderline
Qmin delimiting the range of q is an increasing function of p. The qualitative
results are indeed general.
G(Q, p, ²) = q(Q, p, ²)g(Q, p). (12)
4.2 the solution
Now our firm can choose both Q and p simultaneously to maximize its total
profit:
Recall that the range of Q and p is in [0,1], plus the additional constraints
that only q and g non-negative values are admitted. Given ², we can find
Q∗(²) and p∗(²), by requiring the two partial derivatives ∂G/∂Q = 0 and
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∂G/∂p = 0 being simultaneously zero. The solutions are readily found to be:
Q∗(²) =
1 + 2AQ0 − A2 + A2Q0
3(1− A+ AQ0) , p
∗(²) =
2− 2A+ 3AQ0
3(1− A+ AQ0) . (13)
To better appreciate the solutions, we plot them in Fig.11 with varying ².
We can define the quality-to-price ratio η(²) = Q∗(²)/p∗(²), which is also
plotted in Fig.11. We see with increasing information capability, (i.e. with
an ² from a very large value gradually reducing to zero), the ratio η improves
from 1/2 gradually to 1, the maximal value. Not surprisingly, both price and
quality increase with improved information capability, but the latter faster.
The myth of quality being uniquely priced has little basis. The ideal limit
² = 0 can never be attained. Thus the price-quality correlation necessarily
depends on the varying degree of ².
The results similar to those in the previous sections about total profit is
readily obtained; substituting the above solutions (Q∗(²), p∗(²)) back to G,
we find
G∗(²) =
(1− A)3
27²(1− A+ AQ0) . (14)
Similarly, the quantity actually transacted q∗(²) ≡ q(Q∗(²), p∗(²), ²) can be
also found. We plot both G∗(²) and q∗(²) in Fig.12.
In fact the asymptotic behavior is of interest: when ²→ 0, to the leading
order we have Q∗ → 1 − ²(1 + Q0)/(3Q0), p∗ → 1 − ²/(3Q0), η → 1 − ²/3,
q∗ → ²/(9Q0), and G∗ → ²2/(27Q0). Both q∗ and G∗ vanish with ², a feature
related to the fact that we have chosen the margin profit δ = 0. With
competition under limited information capability we expect δ 6= 0, rather
G∗ approaches a small, positive constant as ² → 0. With such a constant
the algebra can be extended straightforwardly, though the solutions are less
compact.
The scenario that we have discussed in the first section can be trans-
planted here; both sides can influence the ²-evolution one way or the other,
depending if their interests conflict or not. From the above G∗(²) we can find
the inflection point ²∗, and regions I, II, III can be similarly designated. The
quantity q∗ can be either a monotonical function, or with a peak for a finite
² value. The above solutions are simplest when the excessive profit margin
δ = 0. For finite and positive δ values, total profit G∗ near the point ² = 0
is higher than that for ² = 0. For sufficiently large δ the inflection point ²∗
can disappear, so that G∗ becomes a monotonical function, in this case the
‘defensive’ region I may disappear.
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4.3 partial freedom
Often a producer does not have the same freedom in choosing both variables:
in some cases he has his Q more fixed than his p; in other cases p more fixed
than Q. One example of the former case can be that the producer already
has his product made, thus Q is fixed, leaving him to vary price while Q is
treated as given. In somewhat less fixed Q-cases, his machines for making
high-end products already purchased or he has learned skills for high-end
products, such long term investments would be wasted if switching to low-
end products. So relatively speaking, he has more flexibility in price than in
quality, and again we can treat Q as approximately as given.
On the other hand, for the fixed p-case, we may imagine a competitive
market where price is well established. A new entrant or just any participant
firm would not change price, but has some leeway at tinkering with the less
visible factor, quality. The famous ‘sticky’ price puzzle[15] provides another
example: often ‘menu costs’ are cited as a reason. But in our view a firm
often tries to keep the price invariant as it has many other factors less visible
to consumers that it can constantly fine-tune. There is no clear cut criterion
as to which variable should be treated as given and which flexible—one must
bear the above possibilities in mind when studying real applications.
The above two types of partial freedom can be easily addressed within
our formalism. If quality Q is treated as given, then the condition of the
derivative ∂G(Q, p, ²)/∂pQ = 0 yields a maximizing function p = p(Q), for
any given Q. If on the other hand, price p is fixed and Q can vary, a similar
condition ∂G(Q, p, ²)/∂Qp = 0 gives rise to a maximizing function Q = Q(p).
It is important to note that these two functions are in general not inverse
of each other, except at the intersection points. In Fig.13 we show both
functions for a few ² values.
First we observe that for a given value of p, the corresponding Q(p) is
larger for higher information capability (² smaller). On the other hand,
for a given Q, the corresponding p(Q) is smaller for improved information
capability. For an high-end product (Q → 1), the price is hardly sensitive
to Q, implying the firm has little pricing room here. This hides however an
important difference: q is highly sensitive to Q, even near the Qmax limit.
The partial freedom in choosing either p or Q implies some subtle conse-
quences. In Fig.13 we see three pairs of the functions p(Q) and Q(p) for three
different values of ². All the intersection points form the solutions (Q∗,p∗)
plotted in Fig.11. Let us concentrate (fig.14) on one pair of these functions
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for ² = 2 and call the region below their intersection point as ‘lower end’
products and above ‘higher end’ products. We have singled out three points
on these two function at the lower end region, denoted by (Q1, p1), (Q2, p1),
and (Q2, p2). Compare now the production possibilities at price p1. We see
at the same price p1, Q2 > Q1. This implies that if the firm has the freedom
to choose the quality Q, it will choose a higher quality to produce for its own
profit rationale.
Now compare the production possibilities at the given quality Q2. Since
p2 > p1, we deduce that the rational firm will mark-up the price for the same
quality, if it has the pricing freedom. This argument can be repeated: if the
firm somehow fixes its price at p2 and is flexible in tinkering with Q, it would
choose a still higher quality. We see such iterations lead to the intersection
point (Q∗, p∗) at ² = 2, as by definition it is the stable fixed point. The above
argument is exactly inverted when we consider the higher end region above
the cross point. We can draw the conclusion: Facing the handicap of partial
freedom, the firm will tend to shift whichever variable is free upwards in the
lower end region, to either mark-up price when quality is given or to offer
better quality when price being fixed. In the upper end region, the rational
firm will tend to do the opposite: to either mark-down price or to cheat on
quality. All this is due to the overall imperative to maximize total profit with
partial freedom to do so.
The above correlations p(Q) and Q(p) are preordained by the condition
that total profit is to be maximized, while one of the two variables is held
constant. This is not the only way to obtain correlations between Q and
p. We may imagine in certain circumstances the total output (i.e. quantity
q(Q, p, ²)), is to be held constant; this imposes another type of correlation
p(Q)q or Q(p)q, the subscript denotes the fact that the relation arises con-
ditional on q being held constant. The two functions now are inverses of
each other, in contrast to the correlations induced by the max-G condition.
Mathematically, we may likewise induce other correlations by holding one of
the three variables q, Q, and p constant; we would obtain a function of a
single variable and it is invertible. Whereas some of these conditions may
be relevant under special market circumstances, in general we do not expect
these correlations to play a very significant role in the real world, as the
max-profit remains the main concern for the firm. Therefore most attention
should be on the results from the max-G condition.
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5 Competition leads to efficiency?
So far we have analyzed our model as if there is just a monopoly. Com-
petition must be addressed now and we shall see imperfect information on
consumers’ part demands a careful re-examination of the traditional compe-
tition analysis; for finite ² the competition cannot reduce the profit margins
to null. Let us consider now what competition would do to the profit margins
g∗(²) = (1 + δ)p∗ −Q∗.
5.1 cournot competition
We consider the simplest case where two competing firms produce at the
same price and same quality (the more general case when firms compete
with different prices and qualities will be relegated to a full discussion else-
where). Denote by q1 and q2 quantities produced by firms 1 and 2, the market
composed of the two firms has total output of q = q1+q2. Similar to Cournot
competition, from q = q1+ q2 = q(Q, p) one can solve for p = p(Q, q1+ q2, ²).
Firm 1 decides its q1 assuming q2 is given. The total profit for firm 1 is
G1 = q1g(p(Q, q1 + q2, ²), Q), which is to be maximized varying q1 and Q,
with ², and q2 as given and p as the above function. We need to solve two
conditions: ∂G1/∂q1 = 0, and ∂G1/∂Q = 0. Likewise we can solve for G2
with respect to q2 and Q. The calculation is straightforward and we shall
not bother to present all the expressions, except to state the conclusion.
The resulting q∗∗ ≡ q∗1 = q∗2, Q∗∗ and consequently p∗∗ ≡ p(Q∗∗, q∗∗ + q∗∗, ²)
should be compared with the single firm monopoly case Q∗, p∗, then the
quality-to-price ratio η∗ = Q∗/p∗. The competition of two firms with the
same Q and p leads to enhanced market efficiency: in general we obtain the
ratio η∗∗ = Q∗∗/p∗∗ > η∗, confirming the general expectation that competi-
tion leads to better efficiency. Much more space is needed to address fully
the complex relationship when a finite number of firms competing with each
freely choosing their q′s and Q′s, as well as the cases analogous to Bertrand
price competition.
We may naturally ask the question: if an infinite number of firms com-
pete in a given product niche, would the profit margin be driven to null, as
neoclassical economics affirms? Granted that an infinite number is a fiction,
so consider a weaker version of the above position: would a large enough
number of competitors make the profit margin negligibly small? We shall
see that the question is far from settled, and the answer is actually nega-
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tive: no matter how large is the number of competitors (including literally
infinity), the profit margin cannot be driven to null, as long as information
capability remains limited.
The above analysis of straightforwardly generalizing Cournot competition
contains a subtle fallacy, which emerges naturally when information capabil-
ity is limited, i.e. ² > 0. The reason goes as follows. A consumer with a
certain level of information capability parameterized by ² 6= 0 faces two or
more competing firms touting similar products. Her information capability
is a combination of both her cognitive abilities as well as effort she must
spend each time she inspects a product. Facing two or more products her
information capability must be split among competitions. This splitting of
her already limited information capability need not be linear, but in general
her per-unit information capability is worse than that when there was only
a single product. The above analysis about the generalized Cournot com-
petition seems to indicate that her overall welfare is always improved; and
when the number of competitions is infinite the firms’ profits are driven to
null. But we must include the negative effects due to worsening information
capability.
5.2 information capability spread
Suppose that the number of competitions is very large. A consumer must
then decide whether to spread her already limited information capability very
thin on all the competing products, before making a choice, or to simply in-
spect only a small fraction out of all the available products. In a previous
work [16] we have developed a model and obtained a general result that facing
the dilemma: either to spread information capability very thin, or to con-
centrate on very few or even a single item with relatively large information
capability. It turns out that the best strategy is to consider a finite number
of competing products, neither too large nor too small. The analysis was
done for considering investment opportunities but the same mechanism can
be readily transplanted here for competition in consumer products. With
an optimal, finite number of competitions to inspect, her welfare is best
served. Even if the competition number becomes infinite, she would still
stick to a finite number of them. They can be picked randomly from the
large set of all competitions, or from other factors like geographic locations,
marketing gambits, etc. Competition for the firms is both a bliss and curse:
bliss because thinly spread information capability make the defensive mea-
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sures more effective; curse because usually competitions drive down profit
margins. Competition under Luckily for them, consumers cannot take full
advantage of competitions for lack of perfect information for detection. We
can now draw the general conclusion: since only a finite number of competi-
tions is relevant for a rational consumer with limited information capability,
the profit margin can never be driven to null, even when there are infinite
number of competitors.
6 Heterogeneous consumers
Most interesting for us is to consider consumers as heterogeneous in their
information capability. We thus relax the simplifying assumption that all
consumers have the same ², consistent with our working agenda of opening
the Pandora’s box gradually but incessantly. Though we do not associate a
monetary value to a consumer’s information capability, in general she must
spend resources and effort to keep her information capability high. She may
be an expert in a particular product niche, able to see through all the market-
ing gambits by the producers, but if she could get good quality effortlessly,
she would prefer to be lazy and careless. Inhomogeneity also arises because
of individuals’ disposition of abilities and interests can be widely different.
6.1 average vs outstanding consumer
An individual consumer maybe careless in making a purchase decision, but
she may expect that all other consumers collectively must be doing their
due diligence. She may take comfort in thinking that since the firm targets
consumers as a whole, the price hence the underlying quality must be right.
The firm can fool one or two, but it would be impossible to fool all. We need
to inspect in detail such assumptions. First of all, information capability
of non-communicating consumers doesn’t add up: twice the number of con-
sumers for a given product doesn’t double average information capability.
Among a large number of consumers certainly there are some experts but
their information capability doesn’t automatically translate into improve-
ment to the average. However, this can drastically change upon intervention
of information matchmakers that can leverage individuals’ information ca-
pability, especially in the internet age, an issue we shall explore elsewhere.
Therefore relevant information capability is on the per-person, per-product
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basis, which cannot be improved by the shear large number of consumers.
Besides, each consumers spread her information capability among a myriad
of products and service. Firms must always deal with a consuming public
with the finite average information capability.
Let us examine what incentives for an individual consumer to depart
from the average information capability, if she has such options. First let us
consider the simplest case with N consumers having the same level of ²pack,
except one out of the pack with her ²′ 6= ²pack. Facing the split consumers,
the producers would target average information capability, i.e. ² 6= ²pack, this
difference is very small for N large, proportional to 1/N . Elsewhere we shall
show that if consumers’ information capability is not much different from
each other, the rational response from the producer is still a single product
variant, targeting the average. However, as the heterogeneity in consumers’
information capability increases over a threshold, the most profitable strategy
for the producer is to have two variants: one variant has higher quality-to-
price ratio η than the other. If the heterogeneity is still greater, more than
two product variants would be needed to maximize the producer’s profit. The
diversification emerges in a step-wise manner, the full analysis on exactly
when the steps happen however is relegated to elsewhere.
Let us check the result of one consumer being ahead of the pack. Her
action will raise the average consumers’ information capability a little higher,
on the order of 1/N . The net benefit to consumers is the same for everybody,
though not much, as a consequence of the improved 1/² value. Thus there are
a lot free riders and just one driver: the outstanding consumer contributes
to the ‘public good’ without having any additional benefits to compensate
for her more-than-average effort. We know that such public good does not
carry sufficient incentives for individuals to contribute, and its fate is like
many other public goods—rather precarious without additional institutional
settings. However, some consumers may be spontaneously willing to be active
‘drivers’, i.e. by striving to have smaller ². This is because not all consumers
have the same ability, leisure, or personal pleasure of finding better bargains,
even without extra compensation. Likewise, we may imagine the opposite
case where all consumers having a rather low ² value, i.e. all diligent drivers;
except one clever but lazy free rider. His reasoning: if I stop driving hard, the
average ² wouldn’t deteriorate much (proportional to 1/N), but in so doing
I’d save a lot of effort whereas the tiny damage resulted from my shirking
would be spread on everybody, so it’s still advantageous to do. As one can
easily recognize such circumstances in the well-keeping of ‘public goods’, if
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everybody in the pack thinks like the above opportunist, the community’s
information capability will deteriorate.
Things become very different if consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous
that the rational firm would find it more profitable to have different variants
in quality and price. Let us consider a simple but instructive case: consumers
are divided into two groups, one with low ²low, the other with high ²high. We
consider those in the low group as drivers, and those in the high group as
free riders, relatively speaking. The firm provides two product variants, one
with higher quality-to-price ratio and the other lower. For the producer it
is convenient to mix the two variants, since selling them separately would
not be a good strategy: even losers won’t go to ‘Suckers Mall’ all the time.
If he could he would target the two groups separately, with a separate (²-
dependent) optimal strategy for each group. But our two groups of consumers
do not live in two segregated locations. The best the producer can do is to
mix the two variants. His reasoning: since there are some suckers (free riders)
but I don’t know who they are, if I sell only the high η-ratio variant these
free riders would really get a free lunch. On the other hand, if I sell only the
lower η-ratio variant, the more informed consumers would shun my product—
a less than optimal strategy. By mixing the two variants I can hope that the
less informed consumers who would be relatively blind to the distinction,
will have equal probability to stumble on the lesser product; whereas the
more informed consumers who can relatively easily differentiate the quality-
price difference and preferentially single out the better variant, will not be
alienated.
6.2 doing well by doing good
Let us consider one individual consumer in one of the two groups. Suppose
she is in the group of the less information capable. Suppose she has some
possibility to become an informed consumer if she wants to spend a certain
effort (again no need to price effort here). By striving she manages to switch
to the more information capable group, thus the average ² for the population
is improved a little (1/N), therefore like before there is some benefit accrued
to all consumers. The most important observation is that she does get an
additional reward that goes with her striving! By switching groups she has
now an appreciable gain by getting a better quality-to-price ratio; at the
same time she did a social service by improving average global information
capability. Her own additional benefit is some constant independent of N ,
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which is the difference between two consumers belonging to the two different
groups. So she gets a relatively big benefit (of the order O(1)), while doing
a small service to each fellow consumer in the population (of the order of
1/N , but the population as a whole receives a finite contribution of the order
O(1)). If more people likewise switch from the ‘passive’ mode to the ‘active’
mode, each would get an appreciable compensation for their effort, while
contributing at the same time to the population. We see by this logic there
is reason to expect the ‘Invisible Hand’ can motivate driving: whoever in her
own judgement can play a contributing role will get compensated as well as
inadvertently promoting a public good. If information capability levels are
in region II (Fig.5), even the firm benefits from her action.
The above analysis can be readily borne out by following our mathemat-
ical prescriptions, but the qualitative conclusion is quite general. The above
problem was first examined by Tibor Scitovsky, in his well known book Joy-
less Economy [17]. He considers the dilemma faced by consumers, to be a
free rider or a driver? His conclusion is rather pessimistic: consumers choose
to be free riders as there is no individual reward for their striving. His so-
lution is to appeal to government agencies for safeguarding the vital public
good—information. Our conclusion is opposite: sufficiently-inhomogeneous
consumers call for the rational producer to respond with multiple variants,
which in turn would make individuals’ striving rewarded with extra benefits,
thus the welfare of consumers may be taken care of by market forces also,
consistent with the basic motto in the capitalist economy: ‘doing well by do-
ing good’. Facing product diversity in quality-to-price ratios, more informed
consumers start to be discriminating, picking better ones for themselves, al-
beit through some extra effort. In other words they don’t believe the price
is very communicative. On the contrary, neoclassical economics advocates
that price is perfectly communicative, and nobody can make extra gains and
there is no ‘driving’ worth doing. This fosters indolence, and if consumers
were really convinced of such doctrines they would stop driving even if they
could, with the end result of denying a vital driving force behind the capitalist
economy.
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7 Asymmetric Costs of Failure
7.1 generalist vs specialist
Since we consider all economic transactions to be subject to asymmetrical
information of varying degrees, we need to examine its origin. We shall see
that such asymmetry is actually the result of another type: asymmetric costs
of failure. Our approach to the law of supply and demand treats buyers and
sellers in an asymmetrical manner: consumers have a buying predisposition
depending on quality and price; firms strive to make maximal profit from such
given demand functions. On the other hand the standard neoclassical supply-
demand law is symmetrical for both parties, both sides with fixed propensities
and their intersection point yields market price and quantity. Is there any
fundamental reason to treat the demand and supply sides asymmetrically,
or is it just a convenient device? We need to address the question in this
section. For this we must take a detour to examine the causes of information
asymmetry.
It is convenient to portray the more informed side as more calculating,
and the less informed side less calculating. Though the intrinsic cognitive
capability can be the same for both producers and consumers, the produc-
ers need to concentrate on a narrow niche whereas consumers must spread
thinly their information capability among many niches. In another work by
Scitovsky[18], he systematically portrays consumers as ‘generalists’, whereas
firms as ‘specialists’. It is not surprising that consumers, in their conduct of
daily life, need a myriad of products and services; there is just not enough
information capability for them to be too calculating on every single niche.
Firms, on the other hand, must be more focused on a narrow range of prod-
ucts and services. The decision for a consumer to buy or not buy a given
product is not as important for her as for the firm producing/selling it—the
latter’s core business. The firm cannot afford to be as careless and sloppy
as consumers in all the details regarding a product. A firm’s stake is much
higher than that of consumers for a given product. A consumer can fail to
buy a good product, or be cheated through another purchase, it is only a
small part in her overall consumption life. Therefore we must face the fact
of ‘asymmetric costs of failure’ of the two sides.
The principle of asymmetric costs of failure is a well known concept in
biology. Dawkins in his book [19] Selfish Gene explains this principle vividly
using the dinner/life metaphor: when a fox hunts a rabbit, the rabbit usually
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outruns the fox. The rabbit runs faster in general since its stake is higher
than that of the fox. The fox can permit itself sometimes to be a bit sloppy in
hunting, as a missed dinner for the fox is less fatal than a missed escape for the
rabbit. Like the rabbit, a firm is obliged to investigate more, since it can ill
afford failures. This asymmetry dictates that the firm necessarily must know
more about its products than consumers do, to tinker with quality factors
and to price carefully. Hence we conclude that the generalized information
asymmetry we advocate in this paper has its ultimate roots in the asymmetric
costs of failures.
7.2 price taker vs price maker
In the perfect equilibrium all participants are price takers; none has enough
clout to influence the price. In the presence of general information asymmetry
the price-taking assumption of neoclassical doctrines must be re-examined.
If both sides have perfect information and are rational, buyers and sellers can
reach the equilibrium price by a ‘Walrasian process’. Indeed there are places
in modern markets where professional buyers and sellers find out prices in
approximate agreement with a Walrasian scenario.
But most transactions vital to the economy are done by the seller’s posting
a price and buyers decide if the deal is good enough to take the bait. Why
are sellers most often the price maker? The simplest price making is to post
a price; he must make it somewhat acceptable to the other side. Proposing a
price inevitably leads to a wait-and-see process, to see if the buyer accepts or
not the deal. The asymmetric costs of failure force the seller to have superior
information and to be more calculating. Price-making is a complex and more
calculating procedure: First you need to figure out your side and the other
side’s gain and loss and the likelihood of acceptance, then post a price, and
still have to wait to see if the deal goes well according to your expectations or
not. If not, either quality and price or both have to be modified to maximize
realistic profits. A consumer, being less calculating, simply judges if a deal
is good enough, to the extent her information capability allows; she decides
either to buy it or to walk away. She bases her satisfaction criterion on a
limited number of alternative offers that she happens to have checked out,
as well as her limited attention/capability of knowing the real quality behind
these checks.
There is another asymmetry between consumers’ wants and possible sup-
plies the firms can make. Relatively speaking, the wants are less flexible
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than the production possibilities. Whereas there are only a limited num-
ber of wants, there are virtually unlimited possible suppliers, if need be.
Apparently when a market clears the wants are met by the supplies—there
seems to be a one-to-one correspondence. This apparent symmetry hides an
asymmetry, since what is actually supplied is only a tiny fraction of what
could be possible. There are much more would-be suppliers than there are
would-be consumers. With a large number of would-be suppliers lurking,
the supply side normally does the wooing. Wooing leads to proposing, hence
price making. The asymmetric costs of failure are also behind this new type
of asymmetry, since the failed supplier would be replaced by newcomers in
no time. In the real economy, there are littered countless failed suppliers,
not that many failed consumers. In some special circumstances the sellers
are small and many, the buyers big and few (think of the small banana farms
vs multinational banana importers), in this case the role of the asymmetry
is reversed and the monosony problem can be similarly analyzed.
7.3 horizontal vs vertical search
Our model of information capability so far can be said to be about vertical
search for a product: a consumer knows what she wants to buy, but needs
digging to ascertain the product’s quality. Let us mention the problem of
horizontal search when a consumer is aware only partially of all the similar
products, i.e. before ascertaining a product’s quality there is a need to first
match the consumer wants to many possible alternatives. To motivate our
problem, we consider a simple model: there are N production possibilities
(combinations of attributes as well as a price), which are possible products
but not necessarily produced. For simplicity we assume that the producer is
aware of all of them and a consumer only a small subset of all, K < N , chosen
randomly. The producer has certain preferences over all the N possibilities,
he ranks them from his top choice down to the least preferred one. We
consider only the viable products, even the least preferred choice is still
meagerly profitable to the firm. In general the interests of consumers are
not perfectly aligned with that of the producer, but they are not necessarily
opposed to each other. The simplest assumption is that they are ‘orthogonal’
to each other: the ranking of a consumer is a random reshuﬄing of the firm’s
ranking. Two distinct consumers may differ in their rankings about the
same set of production possibilities to reflect idiosyncratic tastes, but they
are not random and normally are strongly correlated with each other. To a
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first order approximation, we treat consumers’ ranking as homogeneous, and
concentrate on the difference between consumers’ preferences and that of the
firm. More detailed study should examine the cases when the two sides’
interests partially overlap or partially in conflict, as well as inhomogeneous
consumer tastes.
Thus we have N distinct production possibilities which are ranked dif-
ferently by the two sides. Since the consumer knows explicitly only a small
fraction of the total, how can she rank the possibilities that she doesn’t know?
If a production possibility is not explicitly known to the consumer, and if a
firm proposes it to her, she is able to recognize it and find a place in her rank
list. Thus those not explicitly known to her cannot be proposed by her, but
can be passively judged by her if proposed. The above orthogonal relation
implies that the top choice on the ranking by the one side occupies only a
random place on the other’s ranking of preferences. Let us say that the top
choice for the producer may not be the consumers’ top choice, probabilisti-
cally speaking. In the perfect information symmetrical case (K = N) where
both sides know all the N production possibilities, we can show that both
sides must find a compromise part way down their ranking lists, at a dis-
tance of
√
N from their top choices, respectively. Though both sides cannot
achieve their top choices, the compromise point is still far better than their
average ranking position (
√
N << N/2). One can easily show that the above
compromise point is the best possible mutually acceptable solution, statis-
tically speaking. When the acceptable solutions are found, sometimes one
is proposer sometimes acceptor, with equal probability for both sides. The
calculation is similar to that of the ”Stable Marriage Problem”, a combina-
torial mathematical problem [20] well known to game theorists and recently
there is renewed interest among physicists [21]. Most interesting is when the
consumer side knows only a fraction of the total possibilities; this limit rep-
resents a new sort of information asymmetry, hence we label it ‘horizontal’,
to be distinguished from that for the above ‘vertical’ search parameterized
by ². It can be shown that with the asymmetrical information, i.e. con-
sumers are only aware of K of the total possible production possibilities N
(K ≤ N), the compromise point acceptable to both sides tilts toward the
gains of producers. The analytical solution, using the so-called mean field
method, turns out to be exactly the same obtained previously for SMP with
partial information [22]. Let X and Y denote the distances from their top
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choice for the producer and consumers, respectively, then we have
X =
√
K, Y = N/
√
K. (15)
(This solution obtains from the more general case when there are total N
production possibilities, both producer and consumers know only a random
fraction of the total, such that K < M < N . We still have information
asymmetry since the producer knows more (M) than consumers do (K).
Following the reasonings in ref[22] we readily find:
X = N
√
K/
√
(M +K −MK/N)K, Y = N
√
M/
√
(M +K −MK/N)M.
(16)
When substituting M for N , we obtain the simpler solution (15).)
Most interesting is that the horizontal search model allows to calculate
probabilities of active proposing or passive accepting. In the above sim-
plest case, the mutually beneficial transactions happen sometimes from the
producer’s initiatives, sometimes with consumers’ initiatives, the respective
probabilities turn out to be N
N+K
and K
N+K
. Thus the ratio between the two
is N/K < 1, i.e. more likely the producer actively proposes and consumers
passively accept. Since price is one of the factors in production combina-
tions, we conclude that facing information asymmetry of the horizontal type,
transactions happen with higher probability for the producer to make price
than the other way around. The above model is just the simplest example
to illustrate the qualitative behavior of the horizontal search problem. In
general we should always expect that in a symbiotic relationship that is mu-
tually beneficial to both producers and consumers, their interests will not
be perfectly aligned. The above model uses a random, neutral relation be-
tween the producer and consumers. In general we can have a continuous
spectrum of relations: some are more aligned, some less. If the one side
suffers from lack of total available information, the compromise solutions
would favor the other side with more information. Most such relations are
positive-sum-games, some can happen to be zero-sum-game, still others can
be negative-sum-games.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a simple model for the law of supply-demand
in the presence of imperfect information. Compared to the traditional neo-
classical law we must introduce extra variables: quality and information
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capability of detecting it. Information is not an independent objective vari-
able, rather it resides in the market relation of the two parties. Through this
simple model we have outlined a research program that holds promise to be
able to address a broad spectrum of economic issues. Our approach can be
straightforwardly generalized to other areas where information asymmetry is
believed to exist to some extent: like labor market, financial market etc.
Whereas many results of our new approach may not seem to deviate too
much from neoclassical ones, the fundamental assumption is different. We
consider imperfect information as the crucial starting point and perfection
can never be attained. The most relevant issue for our research agenda is
not about what is the perfect equilibrium which we posit non-existent, but
rather how to find better ones among imperfect situations. Many fundamen-
tal concepts so far taken for granted need to be re-examined. For instance,
we must face the serious consequence that much cherished Pareto efficiency
is no longer relevant in our supply-demand relations in the presence of im-
perfect information. This is true both for vertical as well as for horizontal
search models. The maximal welfare cannot be reached. From the discussion
about the pie-charts (Fig.7) one may wonder, why is the maximal welfare so-
lution not preferred? Wouldn’t it be rational to realize the maximal pie, then
to split the extra gains between the two sides? The short answer is that if
the producer and consumers are left to themselves, as in most markets, such
utopian dreams are not realizable. To split the extra gains requires another
market transaction, which the imperfect information impedes. Current in-
formation capability only allows that much pie to be realized as the best
possible compromise, according our model. The extra pie is beyond reach
by the two sides alone. This is similar to Akerlof’s Lemons Problem: the
seller of a good used car and his potential buyer would end up in a mutu-
ally beneficial transaction, but the asymmetrical information prevents this
transaction from happening.
What can one do to improve upon the reality brought about by the ubiq-
uitous asymmetrical information that permeates almost every aspect of our
economic life? Even if we could improve information capability, the perfect
equilibrium is never in sight: better information capabilities, while improving
current transactions, also open up new possibilities that come with innova-
tions. We are led to a new paradigm in which an economy will never settle
in equilibrium; new and old opportunities come and go with information
technology and improved information institutions.
In the original paper by Akerlof, as well as by other economists, gov-
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ernment intervention is generally called for. Licensing, certifying quality by
consumers protection agencies may help to mitigate somewhat the imbal-
ance of information. We believe there is also a new type of intervention
through market force itself. The big difference between what is possible
and what is realizable presents a new type of attractive business niche that
entrepreneur may fill for their own profits. This business is the so-called
infomediaries that can serve as a matchmaker between consumers and pro-
ducers. Some prototypes have already become household names, with the
advent of the Web: Ebay, Bizrate, Amazon et al. The working mechanism
behind these informediaries is to tap into collective information capability
of consumers, so that as if an individual consumer is suddenly empowered
with much higher information capability. Elsewhere[23,24] we shall explore
in detail how these matchmakers work to improve the information capability
and the consequences.
Acknowledgements: For helpful discussions and comments I thank Mauro
Gallegati, Paolo Laureti and Hassan Masum.
Reference:
[1]A. Marshall, (1920) Principles of Economics (Eighth Edition), London:
Macmillan Press.
[2]C. Babbage, (1846)On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures
(Fourth Edition), London: John Murray, quoted in G.M. Hodgson,(1993)
Economics and Evolution, p.115, Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.
[3]C. Leslie, (1879) ‘The Known and the Unknown in the Economic
World’, originally published in Fortnightly Review. Reprinted in Essays in
Political Economy.(1888), p221-242 London: Longmans, Green, & Co.
[4]G. Akerlof, (1970) ‘The Market for ”Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty
and Market Mechanism’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3),488-500.
[5]A.M. Spencer (1977) Market Signalling: Information Transfer in Hir-
ing and Related Processes, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.
[6]J. Stiglitz (1977) ‘Monopoly, Nonlinear Pricing, and Imperfect Infor-
mation: The Insurance Market’, Review of Economic Studies 44,407-430;
‘The Causes and Consequences of The Dependence of Quality on Price’ J.
Econ. Lit. 25,1-48.
[7]K. Arrow, (1987) The PPB system. Vol. 1. U.S. Joint Economic
Committee, 91st Congress, 1st session. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, pp 59-63. 1987; still earlier anticipation can be found in
Tibor Scitovsky’s Welfare and Competition (1952), London: George Allen
and Unwin, where general asymmetric relations in consumer,labor markets
43
are discussed in details.
[8]K. Bagwell (2001) The Economics of Advertising (International Library
of Critical Writings in Economics Series) (Ed.)Edward Elgar Publishing.
[9]G.J. Stigler and G.S. Becker, (1977) ‘De Gustibus non est Disputan-
dum’, American Economics Review 67,76-90.
[10]H.A. Simon, (1957) Models of Man: Social and Rational, New York:
John Wiley.
[11]K. Lancaster, (1971) Consumer Demand, A New Approach, New York:
Columbia Univ. Press.
[12] P.Sraffa (1926)‘The laws of returns under competitive conditions’,Economic
Journal36,535; D.Colander (1995), ‘The stories we tell: a reconsideration of
AD/AS analysis’, Journal of Econ. Perspectives, 9(3), 169; S. Keen, (2001)
Debunking Economics, London: Zed Books; A. Cohen (1983), Eastern Eco-
nomic Journal 9(3), 213.
[13] R.E.Lucas Jr.(1976)‘Econometric policy evaluation: a critique’, Eds.
K.Brunner and A.Meltzer. Amsterdam: North Holland.
[14] S.J.Grossman, and J.E.Stiglitz (1980) ‘On the Impossibility of Infor-
mationally Efficient Markets’ The American Economic Review, 70(3),393.
[15] N.G.Mankiw, and R.Reis (2002), ‘Sticky Information Versus Sticky
Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve’, Quarterly
Journal of Economics117, 1295.
[16]A.Capocci and Y.-C.Zhang (2001) ‘Market ecology of active and pas-
sive investors’, Physica A298, 488.
[17]T.Scitovsky (1976) The Joyless Economy: An Enquiry into Human
Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[18]T.Scitovsky (1986) Human Desire and Economic Satisfaction: Essays
on the Frontiers of Economics, Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
[19]R.Dawkins (1976) The Selfish Gene, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
[20]D. Gale, D. and L.S. Shapley, (1962) ‘College Admissions and the
Stability of Marriage’ American Math. Monthly 69, 9-14.
[21]M.J. Omero, M. Dzierzawa, M. Marsili, and Y.-C. Zhang, (1997)
‘Scaling Behavior in the Stable Marriage Problem’ Journal de Physique I,
7(12),1723.
[22] Y.-C.Zhang, (2001) ‘Happier world with more information’Physica
A299, 228; P.Laureti and Y.-C.Zhang, (2003) ‘Matching games with partial
information’Physica A324, 49.
[23] Y.-C.Zhang, (2005) The Information Economy, to be published.
44
[24] Hassan Masum and Y-C Zhang, (2004) ‘Manifesto for the Reputation
Society’, First Monday, www.FirstMonday.org Issue July2004.
45
